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Reconfiguring Identity in Schelling's
Wiirzburg System
Michael Vater (Marquette)

Abstract
I consider the identity-theory of the Wurzburg System as part of
Schelling's five-year project to provide a metaphysical foundation for
Naturphilosophie that is free of Kantian/Fichtean subjectivism and
obeys the key constraint formulated by the German appropriation of
Spinoza's: there can be no "egress from the absolute," i.e., no deduc
tion of the limitations of finitude such as the Wissenschaftslehre pro
vided. The demands of epistemic security (the identity of that which
knows and what is known) and ontological simplicity (the impossibil
ity of ontological commitment both to an absolute and to individuals)
are met by reworking the theory of the absolute's 'cognition' so that
God's self-affirmation and self-contemplation are identified with the
philosopher's intellectual intuition. In this way, Schelling integrates
contents that Spinoza left separate in the first three books of the Ethics
and establishes an ontology of power; this grounds a more dynamic
version of Naturphilosophie, where Potenzen themselves become on
tological actors.

In the first canonical text of the so-called Identity Philosophy, Schelling
interrupted his private disputes with Fichte about the extent and di
rection of transcendental philosophy to reply to a criticism that Eschen
mayer had lodged against his Naturphilosophie - that Schelling had
been premature in advancing his theory of nature as an independent
philosophical science, that it needed to be grounded in a prior and more
comprehensive discipline, perhaps something like Fichte's Wissen
schaftslehre. From a starting-point that stipulated that reason was toto
caelo different than the subject's limited ratiocinative process (termed,
in agreement with Hegel's vocabulary, reflection) Schelling hastily as
sembled a logical-mathematical construct based on Spinoza's metaphy-
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sics and used it to preface an elaborate presentation of philosophy of
nature; it appeared in the second issue of the second volume of his
Zeitschrift fiir spekulative Physik, answering Eschenmayer's charge in
its first issue (cf.AA I,10, 116 f.). 1
Schelling's Darstellung meines Systems profited from Eschen
mayer's critique in at least two ways: it incorporated the latter's sug
gestion that nature and spirit can be viewed as negative and positive
quanta of activity and placed on a single mathematical scale, thus facil
itating a uniform treatment of inorganic and organic nature,2 and it
made somewhat ambiguous moves towards adopting Baader's recon
struction of the Kantian theory of matter, with gravity as an independ
ent factor that embraces and unifies repulsive and attractive forces. 3
What is crucial is that Schelling's response to Eschenmayer brings the
concept of Indifferenz to the fore and opens the way to appropriate
Spinoza's two-level ontology, with an ultimate but discursively inacIn Spontaneitiit = Weltseele oder das hiichste Princip der Naturphilosophie, Eschen
mayer had opposed the >pure empiricism< of Schelling's Erster Enwurf eines Systems
der Naturphilosophie to the purified rationalism of transcendental idealism and had
suggested that a natural philosophy, by itself, was incapable of embracing both the in
organic and organic in one theory without making spirit and nature different kinds of
activity (cf. Eschenmayer 1801, 244£.). He suggests that only transcendental philosophy
is capable of uniting the lived freedom of spirit and the encoded version of the same
(passive lawfulness, as seen in the frameworks both of sensiblitexperience and scientific
explications of nature) (cf. Eschenmayer 1801, 235-239). Schelling closes the first issue
of the second volume with a reply to Eschenmayer, Ueber den wahren Begriff der Na
turphilosophie und die richtige Art ihre Probleme aufzuliisen, which concludes in a
clarification of their positions - Eschenmayer wants to retain the opposition of nature
and spirit found in consciousness while Schelling's transcendental con,itruction aims to
show that the same activities, real and ideal, are found in nature as come to the fore in
consciousness. Accordingly, he promises a reworking of the foundation of his system
which will demonstrate that an indifference of opposite factors, spontaneity and limita
tion, or ideal and real activity, can theoretically unite factors that a theory of subjectivity
leaves sundered (cf. AA I,10, 105 f.).
2 Cf. Eschenmayer 1801, 236£., 255-270 and Schelling's Darstellung (AA I,10, 115,
139-141).
3 Cf. Eschenmayer 1801, 267-270 and Schelling's somewhat muddled account of
gravity in Darstellung where identity or productive force is deemed the >ground of the
reality of [the factors] A and B,, hence the first relative totality or the primum existens
(cf. AA I,10, 147-149). Clearly Schelling has surpassed his earlier allegiance to Kant's
deduction of matter as the filling of space due to the opposition of attractive and repul
sive forces. By the time of the Wiirzburg lectures, with their independent treatment of
gravity and magnetism counting as General Naturphilosophie, Schelling has come
around to a full embrace of Baader's three-factor theory (cf. SW VI, 254-258).
1
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cessible self-founding and self-cognized absolute (Spinoza's substance)
serving as ontological ground for parallel but mutually exclusive orders
of phenomenal elaboration, viz. the subjective and the objective (Spi
noza's attributes). The key insight of Schelling's new system is that a
philosophy adequately assured of its rational (not discursive or reflex
ive) foundation can confer systematic unity for a phenomenal world in
which nature and spirit are manifested everywhere together but re
main experientially distinct, in fact irreducible to one another in >feek
It is the disappearing dualism of Spinoza's revision of Descartes' meta
physics that opens the door for Schelling to propose a theory that an
swered the challenge that Eschenmayer had so sharply crafted: that a
pure empiricism suggests a world-order in which nature is its own
lawgiver, sufficient unto itself and has unconditioned reality, while ra
tionalism insists that spirit alone is its own lawgiver, self-sufficient in
the autarchy and autonomy of its willing, the sole item possessing un
qualified reality. 4

I. Identity as Indifferenz, Gleichheit, God's Self-Affirmation,
and Copula
Within the five years that saw various public and private exhibitions of
what he once called Identity Philosophy, Schelling shifted fluidly from
one formula to another for his ultimate systematic principle - ontolo
gically or foundationally called God or the absolute, epistemically
deemed the indifference of the subjective and the objective, the identity
of identity and identity, self-sameness, the identity of identity and dif
ference, the identity of affirming and what is affirmed, and the copula
or bond. 5
4

Cf. Eschenmayer 1801, 244£.
Of the epistemic or phenomenal descriptors, the first two figure chiefly in the 1801
Presentation of My System, the second two in the 1802 essays gathered into the Further
Presentations and the dialogue Bruno, the fifth in the 1803/04 Wi.irzburg Lectures on
the Entire System, and the last in the 1806 essay on the Relation between the Ideal and
Real in Nature. Schelling begins to call the ontological ground ,God, as well as the
absolute in the Wi.irzburg lectures, but Philosophy and Religion shows him retaining
the impersonal or Spinozistic sense of the term in the face of Eschenmayer' s attempt to
entice him toward some sort of theism - one that would inconsistently place a personal
deity before or beyond the absolute perceived in intellectual intuition.

5
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Schelling's initial presentation of identity-theory selected the term

Indifferenz to convey what for Spinoza was the unitary ontological
ground of conceptually or epistemically distinct orders of attributes,
viz. extension and mind or idea, conveyed in nonsubstantive language
by Schelling as >the objective< and >the subjective<. Terminologically, it
was a complicated, probably unnecessarily complicated, task to convey
the notion that every item in a world viewed by reason is an >identity of
the subjective and the objective< without conceding the independent
existence of subjects and objects, as Cartesian dualism had done. The
circumlocution was necessitated by the fact that Schelling wishes to
deny the qualitative difference of subjectivity and objectivity - which
would readily tempt the reader into imagining the independent ex
istence of subjects and objects - while maintaining a vanishing diffe
rence between the two, viz. a quantitative surplus of objectivity over
subjective in instances of subject-objectivity deemed »things« as op
posed to a surplus of the subjective over the objective in items com
monly deemed »mental« (or cognitive or psychological).
Schelling's attempt to reciprocally inflect identity with difference in
the 1801 Presentation was not an improvement on the relative sim
plicity and clarity of its Spinozistic model, which at least anchored its
insistence on ontological unity and epistemic dualism in multiple def
initions and axioms. Though Schelling retains the qualitatively indif
ferent but quantitatively different descriptors foi finite and infinite
instances of God's self-affirmation in the Wiirzburg lectures, he uses
it infrequently. Spinoza's ungainly insights had been translated to a
more pleasant, though misleadingly antique, Platonic terminology in
the works of 1802 which spoke of >the Idea< or >the eternaLt as a unitary
embrace of >the finite< (viz., the material) by >the infinite< (viz., the
mental). The Wiirzburg lectures in fact present a »third wave« of Spi
nozistic illustration of Naturphilosophie, this time employing the ex
planatory device of referring to the absolute and its instantial orders as
the identity of God and its self-affirmation, in which there is again an
identity of what affirms and what is affirmed. 6
6

I make three somewhat controversial claims above, that: (1) as Schelling retrospec
tively claimed, ,Identity-Philosophy, was something of a misnomer for a phase or ex
pansion of the basic project of vindicating a primary place for nature in transcendental
philosophy, (2) that the Platonism of the Bruno and other period essays is a historical
garment draped about the logical figure of the absolute as the indifference of the sub
jective and objective, »the eternal« conveying indifference, which embraces »the infi-
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The Indifferenz of Schelling's original presentation was neither an
anticipation of Hegel's panlogicism nor a quasi-religious claim about an
absolute inaccessible to the default version of consciousness which dis
plays phenomena on a grid where the self of consciousness separates
itself from what it cognizes, though Schelling sometimes does employ
the mystic's talk of >Union< and >separation<. Though logically it antici
pates later logical developments like the Sheffer stroke or its dual,
Peirce's NOR or Quine's arrow, all of them capable of generating the
usual logical operators and hence all the numbers of an axiomatized
arithmetic (save Godel's exceptions), Schelling's intent was not to de
rive phenomena but to show that the dual phenomenal orders of matter
and mind had a common ground even though, in the language which
Jacobi had introduced, no generation of phenomena from that ground
was conceivable: »no egress from the absolute.« Schelling's sole intent
in the Darstellung is taxonomical: since there is no solid qualitative
difference between subjective and objective orders, all phenomena can
be represented on a single line, the objective order signified by negative
numbers, the subjective by positive gradations, and (though he didn't
quite get to articulate this in 1801 except programmatically) the origin
or zero potency denoting the >central< entity, the embodied human
knower. 7 No items in the phenomenal orders, the one predominantly
objective and the other predominantly subjective, are essentially or
qualitatively different; the only difference there is within embracing
identity is quantitative, vanishing distinctions ultimately founded on
comparison of discrete (but homogeneous) quantities.
Schelling's line of thought here was at once too abstract and too
subtle. Fichte gave the presentation a careful, annotated reading but
nonetheless flatly accused Schelling of introducing difference into the
absolute itself - real or qualitative difference, quite a different matter
than quantitative surplus or deficit among finite entities. 8 Schelling
nite«, the mental order of attributal elaboration, and »the finite«, the natural or mate
rial order, and that, therefore, (3) the return to Spinoza's Ethics and the painstakingly
careful argumentation of their condensed axiomatized initial expression that characte
rizes the Wiirzburg lectures marks a third attempt to paint the outline of a transcenden
tal natural philosophy in colors borrowed from Spinoza. The first two alter claims I have
previously made; I regret that I cannot argue them at length here.
7 See the note with which the Darstellung breaks off (cf.AA l,10, 211n.).
8
Fichte's unpublished notes on Schelling's Presentation, when they do not pick at the
sufficiency of the proof Schelling provides, either turn on his own difficulties with
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had tried to use the vanishing difference between the opposite direc
tions of the single mathematical line that can be used to represent all
real numbers, but only to characterize the phenomenal orders. East and
west, negative and positive numbers, material and mental phenomena
are >different<, but not the way that Mars and Venus are different; the
former are ordinally different, the latter cardinally.
By October of 1801 Schelling is starting to employ a more natural
istic and less confusing way to indicate the difference between the iden
tity that characterizes the absolute (and reason), the quantitative indif
ference which characterizes the universe, and the quantitative
difference that marks individuals. The first is termed >the eternal<, the
second >the infinite<, and the last >the finite<. 9 In the Bruno and the
essays on identity-theory published in the N eue Zeitschrift fur specu
lative Physik, Schelling puts the Spinozism of his theory in Platonic
guise, employing terms that are recognizably Spinozistic such as >the
eternal< or >the idea< in a manner that looks classical or antique rather
than modern. One could argue that Schelling is learning to read Spino
za in a more cunning fashion, putting the core of Spinoza's difficult one
understanding indifference in the absolute or the totality and relative or merely quan
titative difference in the individual or on the more substantial issue of Schelling's use of
the concept of grounding, which is an ontological matter and not just an episteme rela
tion. Cf. Fichte/Schelling 2012, 129-131 / GA II,5, 498-504. ~
While Schelling clarified his Presentation in a letter to Fichte on October 3'd, 1801
which said: »This absolute, I claimed in my Presentation, exists under the form of
quantitative difference in the individual (this is intuition[ ... ]) and of quantitative indif
ference in the whole (this is thought)« (F. W. J. Schelling to J. G. Fichte, October 3'd,
1801, Fichte/Schelling 2012, 60 f. I AA III,2, l, 373), Fichte misquotes this back to him in
a reply of October 3th, charging: »I can tell you our point of difference a few words. You say, ,the absolute [ ... ] as I claimed in my Presentation, exists under the form of
quantitative difference., This is indeed what you assert; and it is precisely because of
this that I found your system to be in error« (J. G. Fichte to F. W. J. Schelling, October
gt\ 1801, Fichte/Schelling 2012, 66 I AA Ill,2,1, 381 f.}. Schelling makes sarcastic men
tion of the error in his final letter to Fichte on January 25th, 1802 (cf. F. W. J. Schelling
to J. G. Fichte, January 25th, 1802, Fichte/Schelling 2012, 74 f. / AA Ill,2,1, 405).
9
»It [the separated state of individuals, M. V.J is indeed inconceivable for the reflective
attitude of understanding that ascends from below, that gets caught in insoluble con
tradictions (Kant's antinomies) with the opposition of the finite (your separation) and
the infinite (your unity of all), but not for reason which posits absolute identity, the
inseparable union of the finite with the infinite, as the first [principle J and proceeds
from the eternal, which is [itself] neither finite nor infinite, but both in equally eternal
fashion« (F. W. J. Schelling to J. G. Fichte, October 3'd, 1801, Fichte/Schelling 2012, 62 /
AA Ill,2,1, 375 f.).

1n
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substance/two attribute metaphysics in accessible terms and leaving
behind earlier >schoolboy< imitations of his Euclidean mode of presen
tation. The works of 1802 succeed in reading the Ethics' first book in
light of the second, i.e., the doctrine of substance (or the absolute) in
light of idea and the correspondence between idea and body. 10
The second wave of reading Spinoza transcendentally leans more
heavily on the distinction of Wesen and:Eorm than the first had, turn
ing the absolute identity (Identitiit) of the first presentation into the
Gleichheit (>equivalence<) of the absolute's being and form, if one ex
presses it from the bottom up or in terms of form, or the >indifference<
of subjectivity and objectivity, if one expresses it from the top down or
in terms of substantial being. At any rate, Gleichheit replaces Identitiit,
with the suggestion that the same being of the absolute is expressed in
both the elements of form (Spinoza's orders of attributes), while each
individual within those orders remains what it is, an item of nature or a
mental item, each one coordinated with its opposite but irreducible to
it. Whereas Schelling's first presentation had spoken of the absolute as
an identity of identities, the Bruno speaks of it as the identity of iden
tity and difference. 11
It is no small tribute to Schelling to note that he succeeds in reading Spinoza in a very
creative, properly philosophical style during the years of the identity-theory. Whereas
Spinoza had used axiomatic exposition to explain with utter clarity what could be ex
plained, the transitions from one book to another in the Ethics often conceal what can
not be explained, or can only be explained with the introduction of additional defini
tions, axioms, and lemmas. Individuation or modal differentiation of the orders of
attributes, for example, is assumed but not explained by the hiatus between Books I
and II. The conatus of a modal entity to persist in being, and its experience of itself as
power vis-a-vis other modal entities is inexplicable in terms of mind and body as they
are explained in Book II. The reader enters the realm of psychology, emotions and reg
ulation of the emotions (ethics) only consequent on additional suppositions in Book Ill
about the shifting texture of modal chunks of rest-and-motion, i.e., the individual's
perception of life as its own, consequently as struggle and limitation of power. That
Schelling succeeds in defining the absolute in terms of idea, or the unification of the
universal and the particular, in 1802, and as power or self-expression in 1803/04 is a
significant advance beyond the literal text of Spinoza - in fact, Schelling's liberation of
Spinoza from the materialism and mechanism which he always saw infected his men
tor's philosophy.
11
Cf. AA I,10, 122: »Die absolute Identitat ist also nur als die Identitat einer Identitat,
und <liefs ist die vom Seyn selbst unzertrennliche Form ihres Seyns« and SW IV, 239:
»Denn was sich absolut und unendlich entgegen ist, kann auch nur unendlich vereinigt
seyn. Was aber unendlich vereinigt ist, kann in nichts und niemals sich trennen; was
also niemals und in nichts getrennt und schlechthin zusammengefogt ist, ist eben da10
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Another innovation of what I call Schelling's second wave of tran
scendantalizing Spinoza is that the system's >individuals< are no longer
the items of perception, but genera or meta-individuals, ideas that per
fectly equate and integrate universality and particularity. These perfect
individuals are deemed >ideas<: they are really functional systems. 12
Among them are accounted our stellar center and its surrounding plan
ets, among which the earth is also accounted a living system, an entity
composed both of natural kinds and individuals (cf. SW IV, 277-280).
Though Schelling's language is highly romantic, one can say that he
achieved a precocious understanding of ecology, with at least the living
surface of the planet being realistically conceived as a system of sub
systems, some of them organic, many not. Our problem is not with the
quaintness of Schelling's semi-mythic depiction or the planet or some
dreamy Gaia hypothesis. It is instead a bottom-up problem of the un
foreseen, perhaps calamitous, interaction of systems not well under
stood by our sciences, and even less so by our economists, industrialists
and political leaders.
The identity-theory of the Wiirzburg Entire System is obviously a
return to a close reading of Spinoza's text, with the march of theorems
quite like that of the 1801 Presentation. Since I will examine the text in
greater detail below, it will be sufficient now to remark three rather
obvious things:
- Unlike the first presentation, considerations of philosophical meth
odology (intellectual intuition) are integrated into the system's doc
trinal advance.
The sometimes cryptic axiomatized nature of the firstfresentation is
replaced by a more expansive and explicitly argumentative exposi
tion.

rum sich schlechthin entgegengesetzt.« In the latter text from the Bruno, it seems that
Schelling has conceded that there is a qualitative difference in the absolute, not only
within its form - the division of appearing into being and cognition - but within the
absolute itself, which is both an equivalence and a differentiation of Wesen and Form.
12
See Schelling's first remarks on philosophical construction or intuition of the idea in
intellectual intuition in the fourth essay of the further presentations of the new system
that appeared in the second issue of the first volume of the N eue Zeitschrift fur specu
lative Physik in 1802 (cf. SW IV, 392-395).
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- The self-cognitive (though non-subjective) aspect of the absolute's
form is explained in terms of self-affirmation or contemplation, the
identity of what affirms and what is affirmed.
It is the last item, I believe, that allows Schelling to turn identity-phi
losophy from a purely logical or epistemic enterprise into a power on
tology. This motivates a revision of Naturphilosophie that turns the
potencies from mere classification into something more like ontological
actors or actants, with the human now explicitly poised on top of the
pyramid of nature as the zero-potency, or sole point of connection be
tween nature and spirit. As the being which dwells in centro - capable
of organic self-reversion in brain-structure and herself made the locus
of affirmation in her linguistic capacity - the human is poised to be
come the field of ontological and spiritual revelation that Schelling's
later philosophies depict. 13
In the final phase of its brief and protean life, the identity-theory of
the 1806 Relation between the Real and Ideal in Nature describes the
absolute as a living copula or bond (Band) between the disparate items
philosophy usually distinguishes - idea and actuality, ideality and re
ality, infinity and finitude. 14 Schelling incorporates the language from
the 1803/04 system describing the absolute's form as self-affirmation,
and even speaks of self-willing and absolute willing as formal charac
teristics.15 Just as Schelling is plainly anticipating the dynamic rework
ing of the system that the 1809 freedom essay is based on - which he
calls his first completely determinate treatment of the ideal part of phi
losophy- this essay, like the other three we have reviewed, articulates a
theory of identity as a foundation for Naturphilosophie, not as an in13 Cf. SW VI, 437-442, 477, 487-491-passages which suggest that the living earth can
be understood as being, in a new sense of >center<, the central point of the physical
cosmos, that the human exists in the center of the natural system, and that the true
,micro-deity<, the prototype for all being, is the human being. Both the human species
and as the individual human organism are referred to as »der Mensch gewordene Gott«
(SW VI, 491) and as the capacity to exist in centro is located in the human brain and the
capacity for language (Sprache) it houses or facilitates.
14 I follow Iain Hamilton Grant's translation of the term, who notes in a yet unpub
lished translation that there is both a logical and a physical connotation to das Band.
15
»Das Absolute ist aber nicht allein ein Wollen seiner selbst, sondern ein Wollen auf
unendliche Weise, also in alien Formen, Graden und Potenzen von Realitiit.
Der Abdruck dieses ewigen und unendlichen sich-selber-Wollens ist die Welt« (SW
II, 362).
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dependent discipline (cf. SW VII, 333f.). It is with good reason, then,
that Schelling in the Munich lectures says that his earlier thought was
focused totally on nature (cf. SW X, 107).

IL The Wiirzburg System: Contemplation,
Intellectual Intuition, Self-Affirmation
The Wiirzburg System is as extensive, well-argued, and comprehen
sively explained as the 1801 Presentation was cryptic, concise, and
lacking in an explanation of its methodology. In its overlapping dis
cussions of the cognitive aspect of the absolute as self-contemplation,
intellectual intuition of epistemic unity, and self-affirmation, Schelling
makes clear that his absolute is an epistemic assumption - the unitary
convergence of knower and known - meant to secure the possibility of
truth, not a postulation of some transcendent substance, nor a projec
tion of personhood beyond the limits of finite cognition and agency.
The absolute can be said to know itself in all instances of true cognition,
to affirm itself in all expressions of finite appearances (whether sub
jective or objective). It is the absolute eye, not Fichte's absolute I.16 But
for all that, it is not a subject; even less it is an object. The 1801 Presen
tation expressed this insight enigmatically in saying that absolute cog
nition is the positing of endless instances of finitt subject-objectivity;
now this same insight is expressed more poetically as the momentary
creation of shadow-entities cast by the lightning of divine cognition
falling on the non-being of particularity.17
1

16

»Schon die Alten sagen: Gott ist ganz Auge, d.h. er ist ganz Sehendes und ganz
Gesehenes; sein Sehen ist auch sein Seyn und sein Seyn sein Sehen« (SW VI, 198).
17 Cf. AA l,10, 124: »§. 21. Die absolute Identitiit kann nicht unendlich sich selbst er
kennen, ohne sich als Subject und Object unendlich zu setzen« and SW VI, 197, where
the being of appearances is explained as the reflection of divine power in the powerless
ness of the particular. Schelling offered a more persuasive informal understanding of the
first statement in a long explanation appended to § 30 (cf. AA I,10, 128-130) arguing
that appearances appear only insofar as the absolute is.
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1. Contemplation
The reader of the earlier system needed to be conversant both with
Spinoza and Euclid's Elements in order to knowledgeably read it, that
is, to see that without explicit verbal anchoring in either multiple def
initions or axioms, the system's opening move, which enigmatically
defined reason as the indifference of subjectivity and objectivity and
then moved on to informal discussion of what reason is, how it thinks
and what it demands - in contrast from what ordinary human subjects
do when they believe they know - would be highly perplexing unless
the reader already possessed the capacity for philosophical reflection
and could, by herself, reach the system's principle (cf. AA 1,10, 116119).18 The experience of reading the Presentation of My System is like
being transported up and elsewhere in an enclosed elevator; one knows
what the ground floor was like, but has no inkling of the destination.
Terms such as >identity<, >reason<, >A= A<, and >Unconditioned cogni
tion< do not have much purchase, at least at first. Like a perplexed stu
dent, the reader needs to be told to sit down and think things through.
Schelling finally has the kindness to say this in the 1803/04 lectures,
when he defines intellectual intuition as a knowledge that is at once
immediate, contemplative, and generates conviction through a necessi
ty that is free rather than coercive. 19
The key word here is contemplative: intuition that is immediate and
truly >sees< generally follows for us upon discursive ratiocination or a
thorough investigation because our modes of cognition are infected by
privation or mixed with non-being. For the absolute or God, however,
the simultaneous positing of appearance and the abolition of the so
called objectivity of appearance as »mere appearance« is self-intuition
or direct contemplation. In a passage that is at once beautiful and per
plexing, Schelling makes God all eye, the coincidence of beholding and
The first seven theorems end with a comment that the preceding propositions proved
nothing, since reason is unconditional.
19 »So wie denn auch umgekehrt aus dem Wesen einer contemplativen, einer unmittel
bar anschauenden Erkenntnils der Vernunft gefolgert werden kann, dafs der Gegenstand
einer solchen nur das Absolute seyn konne, und nichts aufserdem. - Wenn wir z. B. die
intellektuelle Anschauung der sinnlichen entgegensetzen, uns diese als eine jederzeit
gezwungene und gebundene bestimmen, in welcher wir uns genothigt fiihlen, so wird
dagegen die intellektuelle Anschauung nothwendig eine absolut-freie seyn« (SW VI,
153£.).
18
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what is beheld, of contemplation and what is contemplated; the alterity
of the reflecting medium or »mirror,« what is for us the finitude or
opacity of appearances, falls away. 20

2. Intellectual Intuition and God's Self-Affirmation
Roughly the first twenty-three theorems or thirty-five pages of the
lecture manuscript are given over to an intertwined discussion of intel
lectual intuition (the absolute's formal aspect) and affirmation or the
identity of God's self-affirmation and what is affirmed (cf. SW VI, 137173). If Schelling had not published Philosophy and Religion in the
same year, with its rejection of Eschenmayer's suggestions that tran
scendental philosophy can and needs be supplemented by an independ
ent theistic philosophy of religion which would reassert the Kantian
postulates of God, immortality of soul, and freedom of the will to sup
port belief in a universal or objective moral world-order, one might take
Schelling's language here of >God< and God's >self-affirmation< as verg
ing on traditional theism. But >God< as little indicates an individual
(albeit supreme) entity endowed with understanding and will (in the
ordinary personal sense of those terms) as does >the absolute<; Schel
ling is still a transcendental Spinozist, and >nature< - as natura natu
rans, to be sure - can still be intersubstituted witfi >God<. Schelling was
adequately clear in earlier writings on identity-metaphysics that when
one speaks of the absolute's form, one is referring to what Spinoza
called the orders of attributes inherent in substance, or to a global cor
respondence of being and cognition, prior to there bein~ any modes of
particular entities that instantiate the two and hence appear as finite
mind-and-bodies or subject-objects. God or nature is and does every
thing, though there is no particular agent, no intention, no subjectivity,
and no specific willing. It is through the disappearing reality or pseudo
objectivity of appearances that the divine intuition is a self-intuition or
self-contemplation. 21
20

K. F. A Schelling rightly says in the introduction to SW VI that the »infinite cogni
tion« or absolute self-cognition of 1801 is expressed in the Wurzburg System as »in
finite affirmation« (SW VI, VII; my translation).
21 Schelling expresses the correlation between the absolute's self-contemplation and the
vanishing entity of appearances in a manner at once striking and utterly simple: one
views oneself in the mirror, or the mirror disappears as object of vision in seeing oneself.
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Only in the perspective of the limited finite perceiver is there any
limited subject or object, or doer and deed. Schelling's enduring quarrel
with Fichte is that the latter insisted, on perfectly correct Kantian
grounds, that however broad and unqualified the assumptions we must
make in order to explain experience, experience itself cannot exhibit
anything other than finite entities and that philosophy can henceforth
no longer tolerate any flights to a substantive personal absolute. Sub
jectivism means that human intellect can explain only what humans
experience, and that merely in piecemeal fashion. 22 Schelling's rejec
tion of subjectivism leads him to embrace a Naturphilosophie which is
neither an encyclopedia of scientific discoveries nor an isolated medita
tion on the methodology of experiment and verification, but a meta
physical proof that »considered in and of itself, nothing is finite,« 23
based on the way interdependent nature comports itself and every
where surpasses limited shapes and operations. Schelling did not jest
when he told Fichte in the Correspondence that the direction of his
thinking was tangential to the enclosed circle of the Wissenschaftslehre
- in a space that was Euclidean and not expected to curve back upon
itself. 24

»Wie das Auge, indem es sich selbst im Widerschein, z. B. im Spiegel, erblickt, sich
selbst setzt, sich selbst anschaut, nur inwiefern es das Reflektirende - den Spiegel - als
nichts fur sich setzt, und wie es gleichsam Ein Akt des Auges ist, wodurch es sich selbst
setzt, sich selbst sieht, und das Reflektirende nicht sieht, es nicht setzt: so setzt oder
schaut das All sich selbst, indem es das Besondere nicht-setzt, nicht-schaut; beides ist
Ein Akt in ihm; das Nichtsetzen des Besonderen ist ein Schauen, ein Setzen seiner
selbst, und diefs ist die Erklarung vom hochsten Geheimnifs der Philosophie, wie nam
lich die ewige Substanz oder Gott durch das Besondere oder die Erscheinung nicht mo
dificirt ist, sondern nur sich selbst schaut und selbst ist als die Eine unendliche Sub
stanz« (SW VI, 197f.). When viewed through reason, appearances disappear.
22 Schelling contrasts the simultaneous limitation and incessant self-reference of sub
jectivism with the open horizon of rationality grounded in reason or epistemic self
coincidence in SW VI, 142 f. »Gabe es nicht in unserem Geiste selbst eine Erkenntnifs,
die von aller Subjektivitat vollig unabhangig und nicht mehr ein Erkennen des Subjekts
als Subjekts, sondern ein Erkennen dessen, was allein uberhaupt auch ist, und allein
erkannt werden kann, des schlechthin Einen, so mufsten wir in der That auf alle absolute
Philosophie Verzicht thun, wir waren ewig mit unserem Denken und Wissen einge
schlossen in die Sphare der Subjektivitat« (SW VI, 143).
23
»Nichts ist an sich betrachtet endlich« (SW VI, 161).
24 F. W. J. Schelling to J. G. Fichte, November 19'\ 1800, Fichte/Schelling 2012, 46 /
AA Ill,2,1, 282.
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3. Privation, Power, and Finitude

The ontological status of the individual or a finite instance of subject
objectivity had posed a problem for Schelling since the earlier days of
the Naturphilosophie augmented by identity-theory. The 1801 Presen
tation of My System seemed undecided about whether individuals or
potencies exist as tranches of the universe or independent items,
whether the basis of their being is finitude - the serial determination
of one individual by another within the flow of phenomenal determi
nation - or their not so apparent intrinsic infinitude, the ability to dis
play the universe as a whole in some determinate, hence somewhat
distorted, form. Then too, there is the question whether it is the rela
tive difference that individuals display as various ratios of differenti
ated subjectivity and objectivity that makes them finite (i.e., less than
infinite) or whether the way they exist as matter and fill space as their
first function or activity is the origin of their finitude. While Schelling
is able to furnish some explanation for apparent >subjects< and >objects<,
he finds it difficult to explain why appearances appear although the
absolute simply is. Naturphilosophie had already taught him that na
ture as dynamic process or matter in metamorphosis is an ongoing
process of reintegrating difference, or incorporating individuality into
totality. But no simple explanation is at hand for why
difference haunts
;
appearances, when logic plainly points out the priority and timeless
being of identity - especially since Schelling wants to stand with Spi
noza against the tide of epistemological reduction and psychologism
that had infected modern philosophy and imprisoned Kant and Fichte
in a sorry and semi-skeptical subjectivism. 25
1
By 1802 Schelling began to earnestly train his eye on the problem of
individuation. Logically considered, the formal or cognitive side of the
25
Viewed through the lens of the problem of finitude or individual, the first identity
theory seems a thin construct, concocted from elements of logic, mathematics, and var
ious assumptions and theorems borrowed from Spinoza. Its allegiance to the letter of
Spinoza, especially the inability to explain modality or account for finitude except
through infinite regress of causal determination among modal individuals, is both its
strength and its weakness. One cannot have ontological commitment both to an abso
lute and to individuals. The strength of the subsequent attempts to paint Spinoza in
transcendental colors is that they are more successful in producing a paradoxical ac
count: if one sees the absolute, finites disappear. If one keeps one's gaze on the finite,
the absolute cannot appear. Evidently being and thinking are not covered in Velcro, as
Parmenides thought.
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absolute must be an interweaving or identification of universality and
particularity. It is easy to attach a name to the product of such activity;
compounded of thought and intuition or concept and sensation; it is
idea or an absolute particular. One can even stipulate that philosophy's
business is to generate an order of ideas, as has been the dream of
logicians and mathematicians since Plato: 26 Relating these to the impov
erished items of experience is difficult, ,:however, where sensory rich
ness and conceptual content seem to ever'.flee each other and the work
of intelligence is reduced to the caveman level of pointing and naming.
The best that Schelling can do to account for finitude in the Bruno is to
talk of the finites' self-sundering from the absolute or a wilful separa
tion from the absolute.27 The origin of separation, or the transition
from being undistorted subject-objectivity, into finite existence as sub
ject-and-object is explained here with a move that is at once a gesture
back to Kantian phenomenalism (time as the form of sensible intuition)
and an anticipation of the more psychological/moral account which
Philosophy and Religion offers of the >fall< of the finite from the abso
lute into selfhood - Schelling's negative reflection of Fichte's teaching
that I is its own deed (cf. SW VI,
In the Wiirzburg Entire System, Schelling does not speak of the
relation of the finite and the absolute as a >fall< or withdrawal from
God until §315 of the philosophy of spirit where he is considering
ethics in the perspective of religion. There he speaks of the presence of
the finite in the absolute as a simultaneous >fall< and >reconciliation<, a
timeless ontological state which religion expresses mythically in terms
26

See Schelling's first treatment of philosophical construction, where ,idea, is contrast
ed to self-separated particularity (cf. SW IV, 405f.).
27 The Bruno argues that it is the inclusion of finitude within the absolute, as ingredient
in the ideas, that distinguishes the absolute's being and form; the individual is ideally
separate as subsisting in the idea (cf. SW IV, 258£.) but is really launched into separate
existence by positing time - distinctions of past, present, and future, depending on
modal relations of actuality, necessity, and possibility which it posits among the community of ideal particulars for itself
SW IV, 284£.).
28 Schelling's rich discussion of the origin of the finite from the absolute in Philosophy
and Religion, with its clear
that there can be no continuity between the abso
lute and the finite phenomena, no production, no emanation, no causation {but only
is crucial
nonbeing, and the misuse of freedom to make space for nonbeing or
first musestablishing the continuity of Schelling's philosophical speculation - from
ings on the Timaeus, to his rejection of Kantian/Fichtean subjectivism, to the philosophy of freedom elaborated
in 1809.
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of time and separate actors within human history. 29 But in the final
thirty-five pages of the identity-theory of that work, Schelling uses a
Platonic theory of nonbeing - the alternate and equivalent formula to
the mythic language of a >fall< in Philosophy and Religion - to give as
much of an account of the finite in its separate existence as can be given
and to integrate his earlier more abstruse account of qualitative indif
ference in the absolute, accompanied by quantitative difference in the
finite with Spinoza's account of the interdetermination of finites as an
endless >passing of the buck< : one finite is determined by a prior, which
in turn is determined by a prior, ... and so on - into infinite regress.
The finite as finite both is and pertains to the absolute - and is not
and in its separation pertains to nonbeing; it is the latter aspect that is
signified by older terminology of >being posited with quantitative dif
ference<. Says Schelling:
Everything particular which as such is posited as quantitative difference
(since there is no particularity by means of qualitative difference) is there
by directly as such also posited as relative negation vis-a-vis the totality. It

is precisely this being and relative nonbeing of the particular within the
totality that is the core of its entire finitude. (SW VI, 181; my translation)

Traditional philosophical talk of being and nonbeing seems rather
bland, abstract, and lifeless. But since the formal, cognitive or self-con
templative aspect of the absolute is affirmation~- or identity of that
which affirms and what is affirmed - there is a dynamic aspect both to
being or being-posited and to nonbeing or negation. Though Schelling
reaches back through St. Augustine's discussion of evil to the Neopla
tonic notion of evil as privation in introducing his discussion of finitude
and individuation, the privation or relative nonbeing d~cussed here is
purely passive, lack of being or power (Nichtseyn, Nicht-Wesen) and
not the antithetical or dynamic negativity (das nicht seyn Sollende)
discussed in the Philosophy of Revelation (cf. SW VI, 198-200, 213 f.
and SW XIII, 236f.).
Still there is relative power or potency even in the nonbeing of the
»Diefs ist das griilste Geheimnifs des Universums, dafs das Endliche als Endliches dem
Unendlichen gleich werden kann und soil; Gott gibt die Idee der Dinge, die in ihm sind,
dahin in die Endlichkeit, damit sie als selbstiindige, als die, die ein Leben in sich haben,
durch ewige Versiihnung ewig in Gott seyen. Die Endlichkeit im eignen Seyn der Dinge
ist ein Abfall von Gott, aber ein Abfall, der unmittelbar zur Versiihnung wird. Diese
Versiihnung ist nicht zeitlich in Gott, sie ist ohne Zeit« (SW VI, 566).

29
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finite in its individual guise. It is not a counterpart or real opposite to
the absolute and its being; there can be but one absolute, one substance,
one being that is self-sufficient and real in itself. As part of God's affirm
ation, specifically, of what is affirmed, it has being of a sort though it
pertains to nonbeing, i.e., it is the community or totality of beings
expressed defectively - or without power, 30 As such it has the status of
a reflection or counter�image, the mirror in which divine cognition
cognizes the divine by simultaneously looking-through and overlook
ing the mirror. The being of appearances is to be reflection or mirage:
an image to be seen and deciphered in its deceptiveness.31
These passages suggest a rich framework for interpreting the Na
turphilosophie that follows upon this opening section of identity-theo
ry. It suggests that nature is the display of the dynamic or expressive
nature of appearances, that the functions displayed in matter, gravity,
light, organism and all specific elaborations of their interactions and
metamorphoses have more to do with the undoing of particularity than
with establishing the permanence of its operations - a progressive non
positing of that which is only accidentally or relatively posited. 32
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